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REFORM THAT UNDERSTANDS OUR SENIORS:
HOW INTERDISCIPLINARY SERVICES CAN HELP
SOLVE THE CAPACITY RIDDLE IN ELDER LAW
Thomas Richard Stasi*
As individuals age, they face an increased likelihood of diminished capacity, which can pose significant challenges in
establishing and engaging in attorney-client relationships.' The US
Department of Health and Human Services projects that the number of individuals age eighty-five and older will increase by more
than fifty percent, from 4.2 million in 2000 to 6.6 million in 2020.2
Furthermore, nearly half of all individuals who live to eighty-five
years old will experience some form of dementia. Although dementia is not an inevitable consequence of aging, an expanding
elderly population' will likely lead to greater numbers of diminished legal capacity questions. In light of this, attorneys need to
adopt effective strategies for assessing legal capacity in their everyday practices. Such policies should seek to preserve a client's
autonomy without creating an extraordinary risk of malpractice
liability.
*
J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Michigan Law School; B.A. 2009, Duke University. Contributing Editor, University of Michiganjournal of Law Reform, Volume 45. 1would like
to thank Professor Alison Hirschel for her professional guidance and inspiration which led
me to research this issue. I would also like to thank Vivian Chang, Saloni Shah, and the rest
of the Volume 45 staff for making my Note become a reality. Finally, I wish to give a special
thanks to my parents for their never-ending care and support.
1.
SeeJan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices-What's an
Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1103,
33-36 (1994) (surveying overall conflicts that elderly clients may pose regarding model
rules that deal with diminished client capacity).
2.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DivisION, PROJECTIONS OF THE POPULATION BY
AGE AND SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2010 To 2050 tbl.12, (Aug. 14, 2008),
available at http://aoa.gov/AoARoot/Aging_Statistics/future-growth/future-growth.aspx#
aging (follow "By Age and Gender: 1900-2050" hyperlink; then follow "Persons 85 and over"
hyperlink).
Cf ALZHEIMER'S ASSOCIATION, 2011 ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES, 7
3.
ALZHEIMER'S & DEMENTIA 1, 12 (2011), available at www.alz.org/downloads/Facts
Figuresl2011.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (Alzheimer's disease is considered to be the

most common type of dementia, and 43% of people age 85 and older have been diagnosed
with this disease.).
4.
ABA COMM'N ON L. & AGING & Am. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER
ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 1 (2005) [hereinafter A
HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS] ("[D]ementia is estimated to double every five years in the elderly, growing from a disorder that affects 1 percent of persons 60 years old to. . . 30 percent to
45 percent of persons 85 years old.").

5.

See id.

695

696

University of Michiganjournal of Law Reform

[VOL. 45:3

It is critical that attorneys ensure the accuracy of capacity evaluations because findings of incapacity have the potential to
significantly compromise a client's autonomy. However, attorneys
may arrive at erroneous conclusions because of personal biases or
concerns about malpractice liability. Indeed, subcomponents of
elder law, such as life planning, are often rife with opportunities
*7
for miscommunication and misinterpretation.
Attorneys often lack the proper professional guidance in determining legal capacity. Not only is capacity an abstract concept, but
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct- (the Model Rules) also
do not provide practical guidelines for attorneys." Rather, the
Model Rules charge attorneys with the responsibility of making this
determination while giving them little guidance with which to navigate a sea of contradictory duties.9
Against this backdrop, elder law attorneys looking to assess legal
capacity are better served by seeking guidance from a combination
of non-legal professionals.o This approach allows an attorney to
gain professional insight into a client's conditions while also fulfilling the client's holistic needs. However, this solution is hindered

6.
Findings of legal incapacity can limit a client's decision-making rights and lead to
guardianship proceedings. See Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing
Interests of Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 321, 29 (2003) ("Under a
guardianship, an individual is declared incapable of engaging in a wide range of transactions and making all but a few significant life decisions. A guardian is appointed to act on
behalf of the incapacitated person or ward, and the declaration of incapacity extends until a
court finds that the individual has regained capacity.").
7.
SeeJan Ellen Rein, Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client: What the Model Rules
Say and Don't Say, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 241, 249 (1998). For example, if an elderly client
makes estate-planning decisions that are unpopular with either the family or an experienced
estate planner, a lawyer might misconstrue this as evidence of diminished capacity, particularly if the disgruntled heirs use this as a basis to claim malpractice. An attorney will be more
likely to make inaccurate capacity evaluations when influenced by these third-party perspectives.
8.
See Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1073, 1082-84 (1994)
(summarizing commentators' critique of the ambiguous definitions of "legal capacity" in
legal doctrines); Rein, supra note 7, at 242 (reemphasizing the burden placed on attorneys
to assess legal capacity because of its ubiquitous yet elusive nature).
9.
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2009) (requiring an attorney
to form a reasonable belief concerning a client's diminished capacity) with id. R. 1.6 (limiting the attorney's ability to disclose client information when consulting with third parties).
10.
Specifically, these professionals include heath care professionals and social workers. See Heather A. Wydra, Note, Keeping Secrets Within the Team: Maintaining Client
Confidentiality While Offering InterdisciplinaryServices to the Elderly Client, 62 FORDHAM L. REv.
1517, 1525-27 (1994) (arguing that addressing a client's legal needs naturally entails consulting other professionals).
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by current ethical rules as well as attorney-client privileges in some
states."
This Note suggests an interdisciplinary approach to assist in determinations of legal capacity. It also urges an amendment to the
Model Rules and current law firm business models, so attorneys
can better approach capacity challenges. While this Note does not
presume to resolve the problems faced by capacity determinations, the purpose is to offer functional alternatives to the current
working models.
Part I reviews the Model Rules' treatment of capacity issues,
detailing attorneys' conflicting ethical duties and the ambiguous
methodology for capacity evaluations. Part II examines the
customary processes that attorneys presently follow for seeking
diagnostic evaluations and highlights their embedded potential for
legal challenges. Part III calls for states to adopt an amended version
of the Model Rules to allow for the full use of interdisciplinary
services in client capacity evaluations. Additionally, Part III proposes
several models that offer administrative guidance for legal capacity
evaluations. These reforms would better shield elder law attorneys
from malpractice liability while preserving the client's autonomy and
privacy.

1.

BACKGROUND: THE INTERSECTION OF LEGAL CAPACITY
AND THE MODEL RULES

Generally, capacity for decision-making is defined as having
"(1) possession of a set of values and goals; (2) the ability to communicate and to understand information; and (3) the ability to
reason and to deliberate about one's choices."02 However, this explanation falls short in practice, as capacity is a "flexible, elusive,
and ultimately indefinable concept."'3 The following Section details
the Model Rules' instructions regarding legal capacity assessment.

See id. at 1527 (highlighting common clashes between the pragmatic needs of a cli11.
ent and the restrictions imposed by the Model Rules); infra Part II.C.
12.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND

OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL

RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH

CARE

Bi-

DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL

AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATION-

57 (1982) (footnote omitted).
See Rein, supra note 7, at 241-42 (explaining how capacity can largely depend on
13.
context).
SHIP
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A. EthicalDuties: A Lawyer's Responsibility Regarding
Legal Capacity Evaluations

The Model Rules fail to provide a working definition of incapacity, offering only abstract factors by which to make a determination.
This places a dangerous burden on attorneys who may be illequipped to evaluate such concepts. Following a brief outline of
the Model Rules' standard determination of legal capacity, this
Section will show how questions of partial legal capacity plague elder client counseling, particularly during the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. This Section concludes by examining
the legal quandary elder law practitioners face when confronted
with conflicting ethical duties.
1. Model Rule Requirements and Challenges When
Forming the Attorney-Client Relationship
Model Rule 1.14 holds the attorney responsible for determining
the capacity of the client. The Rule states:
(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation
is diminished, whether because of minority, mental
impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer
shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client
has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial
physical, financial or other harm unless action is
taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own
interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary
protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action
to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem,
conservator or guardian.
(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule
1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized
14.
Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2009) ("[A] client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach
conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being.").
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under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the
client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary
to protect the client's interests."'
First, the attorney must evaluate competency before the attorney-client relationship can be formed.16 Additionally, the attorney
must reassess the client's legal capacity with respect to any ensuing
decisions.17 Commentators generally agree that the most fundamental question for an elder law attorney is whether a client has
the legal capacity to establish or continue an ongoing attorneyclient relationship.' 8 The Model Rules, however, are particularly
ambiguous regarding this matter. For example, the Scope section
states that "whether a client-attorney relationship exists for any
specific purpose can depend on circumstances and may be a question of fact."'9 However, Model Rule 1.14 does not define the
specific circumstances that are necessary for the formation of such
a relationship.o
The authority for an attorney to act stems from the formation of
a principal-agent relationship.' In line with this theory, Model
Rule 1.2(a) requires attorneys to "abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation."22 This is further
supported by Model Rule 1.14(a) which states that "the lawyer shall,
as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client," even when the client is suffering from a
cognitive impairment.23 But if a principal becomes permanently
incompetent, he or she can lose the ability to authorize legal

15.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2009).
Although the Model Rules do not state this explicitly, it is a prerequisite to an at16.
torney-client relationship for the lawyer to determine if the client has sufficient functional
or decisionmaking ability. Cf., e.g., id. R. 1.14, Scope (17) (explaining that "for purposes of
determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external
to these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists").
17.
See id. R. 1.14 cmt. 1 ("In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no
power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished capacity
often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters
affecting the client's own well-being.").
18.
See Rein, supra note 7, at 245.
19.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope (17).
See id. R. 1.14. Several commentators have criticized this language for its lack of
20.
clarity. See, e.g., Rein, supra note 1, at 1133 ("[The scope section of the Model Rules] cryptically states 'whether a client-attorney relationship exists for any specific purpose can depend
on circumstances may be a question of fact.'") (citingJohn E. Donaldson, Ethical Considerations in Advising and Representing the Elderly 10, undated) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the author)).
21.
SeeRein, supra note 1, at 1133.
22.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009).
23.
Id. R. 1.14(a).
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decisions. Thus, an attorney who represents a client in such a
scenario without a legal representative or guardian may violate
ethical rules in certain jurisdictions.
The lawyer is fundamentally bound by a duty of loyalty to the cli26
ent and should not be influenced by the interests of third parties.
However, this notion has been challenged occasionally by commentators who have suggested a counseling style that accounts for
perspectives other than the client's. 27 For example, Justice Louis
Brandeis proposed that lawyers offer legal advice tailored to the
situation instead of to the individual. Likewise, Professor Sidney
Watson suggested lawyers look to the family as one unit, as opposed to looking to a specific individual.
While the debate concerning competing theories of representation is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to highlight
how the Model Rules and elder law attorneys have tackled counseling issues. Elderly clients often seek legal advice while
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.08 (2006). However, it is important to
24.
note that temporary loss of capacity because of a mental disease does not terminate the
principal-agent relationship nor does is automatically end the agent's actual or implied
authority. This is contrary to the earlier view, where loss of capacity was equated to the
principal's death. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (1958) with
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.08 cmt. b (2006) (arguing that the prior rule in § 122
should no longer be followed because "loss of legal capacity, unlike death, is not always final
and its occurrence is often not precisely associated with a particular moment or event").

25.

See, e.g., TEx. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1.02(g) ("A lawyer shall take reasonable action to

secure the appointment of a guardian or other legal representative for, or seek other protective orders with respect to, a client whenever the lawyer reasonably believes that the client
lacks legal competence and that such action should be taken to protect the client.").
26.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (2009) ("[T]he lawyer must keep

the client's interests foremost and . . . must to [sic] look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf."). This principle has historically been
recognized as far back as the early nineteenth century. 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821) ("[A]n advocate ... knows but one person in all the world, and that person
is his client. To save that client ... at all hazards and costs to other persons ... is his first and
only duty. . . .").

See Patricia M. Batt, The Family Unit as Client: A Means to Address the Ethical Dilemmas
27.
ConfrontingElderLaw Attorneys, 6 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 319 (1992); Sidney D. Watson, When
Parents Die: A Response to Before Guardianship:Abuse of Patient Rights Behind Closed Doors, 41
EMORY L.J. 863, 870 (1992) (recommending a lawyer look to the dynamics of the family unit
when counseling a client regarding guardianship: "Only knowing the family as a unit, and,
above all, by searching for their common interests, can the lawyer advise a family member
on the appropriate steps to take.").
28.
When questioned before the U.S. Senate on legal transactions that involved potential conflicts of interests, Mr. Brandeis explained that he was a "lawyer for the situation."
Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judicial on the Nomination of
Louis D. Brandeis to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 64th
Cong., 1st Sess. 287 (1916). See also Geoffery C. Hazard, Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U.
L. REv. 377 (2004) for a more detailed analysis of this lawyering perspective.
See Watson, supra note 27, at 870 ("Only knowing the family as a unit, and, above
29.
all, by searching for their common interests, can the lawyer advise a family member on the
appropriate steps to take.").
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accompanied by family members who might want the attorney to
do what is best for the family as a whole instead of the individual
client.o Further complicating the matter, Comment 3 to Model
Rule 1.14 specifically permits family members to be included in a
client's legal conversations if there is client consent or implicit
authorization. However, Comment 3 also instructs lawyers "to
look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on
the client's behalf."3 '
Pressure from family members may influence attorneys to ignore
a client's wishes. For example, a client might not always make his
motives apparent while making legal decisions. As a result, attorneys will examine the client's legal decision through generic
cognitive screens or family consultations. However, normative
considerations of what a 'good decision' is may lead an attorney to
overlook a client's personal wishes. Furthermore, when family
members are strongly opposed to the elderly client's legal decisions, the attorney may rely on these third-party interests or
mischaracterize the client's goals in order to avoid a malpractice
suit by the family.34 Thus, taking into account family objectives can
lead to an inaccurate determination of a client's legal capacity.
2. Remaining Ambiguities: Model Rule 1.14's Collision with
Model Rule 1.6's Duty of Confidentiality
Model Rule 1.6(a) impedes effective client representation when
counseling sessions lead an attorney to seek guidance from thirdparty professionals for capacity determinations. While Comment 6
30.
See Batt, supra note 27, at 324 ("These [familial] relationships can trigger conflict
of interest issues .... [W]hat may be the best legal alternative for the elderly client may not
be the most attractive alternative for the heirs or the financially dependent spouse.").
31.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (2009).

Id. (emphasis added).
32.
33.
Generic cognitive screens are customary mental exams or questionnaires, such as
the Baird Brown Legal Capacity Questionnaire and the Mini Mental State Examination. See
Charles P. Sabatino, Representing a Client with Diminished Capacity: How Do You Know It and
What Do You Do About It?, 16 J. Am. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 481, 498-99 (2000); see also infra
notes 95-100 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation of these specific tests.
34.
See Rein, supra note 7, at 248-49 (drawing hypothetical scenarios where attorneys
might be misled in evaluating a client's goals in order to escape malpractice suits from dissatisfied third parties).
35.
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009) ("A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent . . . .") with id. R. 1.14 cmt. 6 (for questions of capacity, "the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician"); see also Wydra, supra note 10, at 1525 (" [The]
Model Rules themselves make interdisciplinary communications necessary to serve potentially incapacitated clients ... . Yet, it is virtually impossible for an attorney to procure a
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to Model Rule 1.14 permits attorneys to seek guidance from
diagnosticians, Model Rule 1.6 restricts disclosure of client
information relating to legal representation without consent
except when "the disclosure is impliedly authorized."0 Clients will
often withhold consent to such third-party assessments because
they fear this will lead to the loss of autonomy through involuntary
guardianship. 7 However, even when consent is obtained, attorneys
may question the validity of such consent because of signs of possible
impairment. 8
In cases where a client fails to grant or refuse explicit consent to
a diagnostic consultation, it remains unclear when Model Rule
1.6(a)'s "impliedly authorized" language permits elder law attorneys to speak with such third parties. In an effort to clarify this
language, the ABA stated that "if the client is in the midst of litigation, the lawyer should be able to disclose such information as is
necessary to obtain an assessment of the client's capacity in order
to determine whether the representation can continue in its present fashion. 4 0 However, because this directive only references
litigation, it is ill-suited for the transactional practice of elder law.
In 2002, an amendment to Model Rule 1.6(b) added an exception to disclosure when a lawyer wishes "to secure legal advice
about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules."4 1 While this exception recognizes concern over ambiguity in the Model Rules and
mental health professional to make the assessment without disclosing secret or confidential
client information.").
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009). Rule 1.14(c) does not solve
36.
this dilemma because it only renders implied authorization when an attorney takes protective action. In order to pursue such protective action, Model Rule 1.14(b) requires an
attorney to have a reasonable belief that a client's capacity is significantly diminished. However, the Model Rule offers an attorney no implied authorization to undertake investigative
measures beforehand in order to form such a "reasonable belief' regarding a client's capacity. Put differently, Model Rule 1.14's exception to disclosure under Model Rule 1.6 does not
seem to take effect until after an attorney has determined capacity. Adding to the confusion,
Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.14 fails to state who qualifies as an appropriate diagnostician.
See Rein, supra note 1, at 1147-48 ("The Model Rules' Terminology section should define
who qualifies as a diagnostician for the purpose of helping the lawyer determine whether
the client needs a formal representative.").
37.
See Rein, supra note 7, at 247. For a more general discussion regarding the impact
of de facto guardianship on a client's autonomy, see Paul R. Trembaly, Impromptu Lawyering
and DeFactoGuardians,62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1429, 1444-45 (1994).
See Rein, supra note 7, at 248 (highlighting that a legal advisor has "no assurance
38.
the consent is valid because only the court can make an adjudication of competency").
Cf Burnele V. Powell & Ronald C. Link, The Sense of a Client: Confidentiality Issues in
39.
Representing the Elderly, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1197, 1236-37 (1994) (offering hypothetical
examples demonstrating the ambiguity and confusion regarding a lawyer's permission to
access third-party consultation opinions).
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-104 (1996).
40.
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) with MODEL RULES OF
41.
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1998).
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the potential benefit of collaborating with other attorneys, states
have failed to expand their disclosure rules to allow lawyers to seek
advice from non-legal professionals."
Aside from the consent requirement, communications between
an attorney and third parties can be adverse to a client's interests if
such communications are not protected by attorney-client privilege. In light of this, an attorney who obtains consent may confer
with a doctor or social worker only if he takes care not to reveal the
client's identity because of the potential harm to the client's interests. However, without conducting physical observations or tests, a
diagnostician will likely have difficulty determining the degree to
which the client is able to make decisions for herself." Thus, the
confidentiality provisions of the Model Rules prevent diagnostician
consultations from being fully effective and discourage attorneys
from routinely seeking assistance from other professionals.

B. Guidance: What to Look Forin a Legal Capacity Evaluation

The evaluation of client capacity is a difficult task for both legal
and medical professionals who must make such determinations
frequently. A common cause of incapacity in elderly clients is
dementia, which develops incrementally and leads to mental
impairment.4 6 As dementia progresses, a client may scale back his
daily activities to eliminate tasks that have become mentally overdemanding, such as shopping, traveling, or paying bills. When a
client with dementia attempts to mask underlying cognitive
42.
See, e.g., OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 5 (2007).
43.
See, e.g., Jones v. Superior Court, 372 P.2d 919, 921-22 (Cal. 1962) (holding that
where an attorney sent the client to a doctor to assist in defense matters, the attorney-client
privilege was extended). For a more general discussion of circumstances when conversations
with third parties are protected by the attorney-client privilege, see Marcia M. Boumil et al.,
Multidisciplinary Representation of Patients: The Potentialfor Ethical Issues and ProfessionalDuty
Conflicts in the Medical-Legal PartnershipModel, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 107, 119-20
(2010).
44.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b) (2009).
45.
Because capacity is contextual, physical observations are critical in elderly client
cases to evaluate what daily tasks she is unable to perform safely. For example, objective tests
such as the MMSE will not reveal to an attorney whether a client will likely forget to turn the
stove off when living alone. See Lois M. Brandriet & Brian L. Thorn, Determining Capacity:Is
Your Older Client Competent?, 14 UTAH B.J. 21, 23 (2001) ("To increase the accuracy of a capacity evaluation, it is essential that the proposed protected person ... be assessed
'holistically' as opposed to consideration of only their mental or cognitive status."); Wydra,
supra note 10, at 1526-27 ("Mental health professionals would need to ... be present to
facilitate the client interview.").
46.
See Peter V. Rabins, Issues Raised by Research Using Persons Sufferingfrom Dementia Who
Have Impaired DecisionalCapacity, 1J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 22, 30-31 (1998).
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difficulties, it is often challenging for the attorney to detect the
early warning signs of diminished capacity.
In addition to identifying these warning signs, diagnosticians
must determine at which point capacity is considered lost.4 ' Because people with dementia are likely to exhibit signs of partial
capacity, dementia is commonly measured on a continuum, as with
pain or anxiety.' However, dementia differs from other continuum
assessments because the responsibility for gauging capacity rests
solely with the evaluator. 9 This allows for a high degree of subjectivity in the analysis, and attorneys must be mindful not to confuse
incapacity with eccentricity or imprudence.5o Both legal and medical experts have continually attempted to devise a more objective
and practical examination with little success.1 Indeed, some commentators have compared seeking a fair and workable client
capacity test to the "search for the Holy Grail.",51 When evaluating
client capacity, Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.14 recommends that a
lawyer balance various factors: "[1] the client's ability to articulate
reasoning leading to a decision; [2] variability of state of mind and
ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; [3] the substantive fairness of a decision; and [4] the consistency of a decision
with the known long-term commitments and values of the client."5 3
These factors were proposed under Peter Margulies' contextual
paradigm model for legal capacity evaluations. 4 Because lawyers
judge client capacity in a task-specific manner, this approach has
been popular in part due to the flexibility of its application.5 3 How-

47.
See id.
48.
See Brandriet & Thorn, supra note 45, at 23.
49.
See id.
50.
See, e.g., Gentry v. Briggs, 573 P.2d 322, 325 (Or. 1978) (holding that a testator was
not mentally incompetent or under undue influence merely because he chose to disinherit
his daughter in his final will).
51.
See, e.g., Rein, supra note 1, at 1128 (theorizing that efforts to develop a pragmatic
definition of the elusive competency concept have produced only greater confusion).
52.
Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 (1977).
53.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 6 (2009).
54.

The contextual model was adopted in the 1994 recommendations of the Fordham

Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients. See generally Margulies, supra
note 8, at 1085-90 (highlighting six important factors in capacity diagnosis: (1) ability to
articulate reasoning behind decisions, (2) variability of state of mind, (3) appreciation of
consequences of decisions, (4) irreversibility of decisions, (5) substantive fairness of transaction, and (6) consistency with lifetime commitments).
55.
See LINDA S. ERSHOw-LEVENBERG, INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. & NJ.
STATE BAR Ass'N, REPRESENTING CLIENTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: ASSESSMENT, AssisTANCE AND ADVOCACY 5 (2009); Michael Levelle, Minimum Capacity to Consent or Act: What's
the Standard?, ELDER LAW NEWSLETTER (Or. State Bar), July 2006, at 5, available at
http://www.bennettblummd.com/idl2.html. Instead of referring to capacity as a static con-
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ever, the Model Rules have historically offered minimal guidance
regarding how such factors should be measured in practice." Because of this lack of rigor, evaluation methods of client capacity
remain inconsistent and susceptible to inaccuracies.
1. Functional Factors
The first two factors in Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.14 evaluate
a client's adaptive abilities.5 " Because the client must knowingly
employ the lawyer's services, these factors are deemed to be prerequisites to the formation of an attorney-client relationship."
Model Rule 1.4(b) requires the lawyer to "explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation."" When assessing the functional factors of capacity, an attorney looks for a client's ability to
communicate and understand transmitted information and her
ability to reason and make decisions regarding the information.!
A functional approach was originally recommended in 1996 by
the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility6 2 and was later adopted in the Ethics 2000
Commission Report."' In contrast to strictly objective testing, this
cept, the contextual model recognizes capacity as a "shifting network of values and circumstances." Margulies, supra note 8, at 1083.
56.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Laffitte, Note, Model Rule 1.14: The Well Intended Rule Still Leaves
Some Questions Unansteered, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETucs 313 (2004) (summarizing the history of
Model Rule 1.14's revisions while highlighting issues that remain unresolved).
See infranotes 72, 80-81, 84, 90, and accompanying text.
57.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 6 (2009) (evaluating "the client's
58.
ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to
appreciate consequences of a decision. . .").
See ERSHow-LEVENBER, supra note 55, at 4 ("There is no attorney-client relation59.
ship unless there are two willing and able parties to the relationship. The client must have
some ability to tell the attorney what the problem is, ask for help, and understand & agree to
the course of action.").
60.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2009).
61.
See ERSHOw-LEVENBERG, supra note 55, at 4-5 (evaluating "The client's ability to
understand the transmitted information is one threshold issue. The ability to make decisions
regarding the information is the other. Both form the lynchpin to the ability to initiate and
sustain the lawyer-client relationship.").
62.
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 404 (1996) ("Rule
1.14(b) does not authorize the lawyer to take protective action because the client is not
acting in what the lawyer believes to be the client's best interest, but only when the client
'cannot adequately act in the client's own interest.' ") (citing MICHEL SILBERFIELD & ARTHUR FISH, WHEN THE MIND FAILS: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH INCOMPETENCY (Univ. of
Toronto Press, 1994).
63.
AM. BAR AsS'N ETHIcs 2000 CoMMIssioN, REPORT ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.14 (2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professionaliresponsibility/policy/ethics

2000 commission/e2kjreporthome.html.
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approach assesses how easily clients are able to function in their
environments.6 4 This philosophy gained popularity among legal
professionals who sought capacity tests which could scrutinize
more than just the substance or effect of a client's legal decisions.
It is important for his attorney to be particularly mindful of such
a philosophy when evaluating the functional factors included in
Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.14. For example, when weighing the
"ability to appreciate consequences of a decision," an attorney
should be cautious in his assessment to not disregard the client's
right to autonomy. The heart of this factor scrutinizes the "risk of
harm posed by the likely outcome of the individual's decision.""
Attorneys must be aware that a client's risky conduct does not nec67
essarily imply or provide proof of incompetence. In light of this, if
the client has demonstrated an understanding of the potential
consequences of the available legal options, then the attorney is
obligated as the client's agent to pursue the objectives he chooses. 9

2. Substantive Factors
The other factors listed in Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.14 focus
exclusively on the outcome of a client's decision. These factors are
subjective in nature, and they may be inaccurately measured because of society's ageist bias.o
Substantive fairness is perhaps the most ambiguous of the factors suggested by Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.14 and Margulies'

See Daniel L. Bray & Michael D. Ensley, Dealing with the Mentally IncapacitatedClient:
64.
The Ethical Issues Facing the Attorney, 33 FAM. L.Q. 329, 335 (1999); Margulies, supra note 8, at
1083. For example, a functional approach assesses whether a client would be able to obtain
the information from an available source, such as a newspaper or magazine.
65.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 6 (2009).
66.
Sabatino, supra note 33, at 497.
67.
Sabatino notes that "Silberfeld and Fish remind us: 'Incompetency is the inability
to make choices. A competent person chooses to run risks; an incompetent person simply
happens to run them.'" Id. (quoting SILBERFELD & FisH, supra note 62, at 65).
68.
It is important not to confuse an understanding of the consequence of legal options with justification for one's choices. In order to satisfy the functional prongs, Margulies
suggested attorneys evaluate if clients are able to articulate reasoning for their choices. For
example, saying "because I feel like it" will not be sufficient. The focus is on the client's
ability to communicate his comprehension, and the attorney need not personally agree with
the client's reasons. See Margulies, supra note 8, at 1087.
69.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation.").
70.
See generally Linda S. Whitton, Ageism: Paternalismand Prejudice, 46 DEPAUL L. REV.
453 (1997) (examining how prejudice against the elderly affects results in the courts and
legislatures).
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contextual approach. While substantive fairness concerns may
allow for the intrusion of the attorney's subjective bias in a client's
assessment,72 Margulies argues that this concept of fairness is important because it keeps track of whether "people are being taken
advantage of or are being unduly influenced in ways that defeat the
autonomy and voice rationale behind deferring to client decisions."73 In other words, substantive fairness emphasizes an
attorney's duty to guard against the exploitation of her client.
This approach to determining client capacity reflects underlying
societal values that can often conflict with ideals of individualism.
Traditionally, attorneys are bound by a professional duty to concern
themselves with a client's legal interests. However, attorney-client
tension may arise when a client's decisions place his long-term assets
at risk, thereby threatening his future financial autonomy.75 While
this tension may be found in an array of attorney-client
relationships, it often appears in elder law because of the attorney's
failure to appreciate the full range of factors that influence a client's
71,
decision-making process.
Some commentators suggest that this misunderstanding in capacity determinations is a result of a broader disconnect between
society and its senior population." For example, when lawyers
question legal capacity and make decisions inconsistent with their
clients' wishes and values, the clients' sense of control is likely to
be undermined. However, people need to feel in control, and
71.

See Margulies, supra note 8, at 1088; Sabatino, supra note 33, at 496-97 ("The one

factor . . . that is perhaps not self-explanatory is that of 'substantive fairness."').

See Sabatino, supra note 33, at 496 ("On first impression, it appears to invite the in72.
trusion of the assessor's own value judgment of the outcome of the client's decision.")
However, Sabatino suggests this threat can be minimized because the concept of substantive
fairness serves as a lever for capacity determinations: as substantive fairness becomes more
difficult to determine, an attorney will instead demand a higher level of functional factors.
See id. at 497.
73.
Margulies, supra note 8, at 1088.
74.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009).
75.
See Rein, supra note 7, at 243 ("[T]here are tensions between that client's need for
autonomy now and the need to preserve the resources the client will need to have autonomy
in the future."); Margulies, supra note 8, at 1073 ("Senior citizens need freedom of action.
Yet, they sometimes seem to act in ways that defeat their other needs, whether financial,
medical, or legal.").
76.
SeeRein, supra note 7, at 243.
See, e.g., Robert Rubinson, Constructions of Client Competence and Theories of Practice,
77.
31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 135 (1999) ("[W]hen counseling an elderly client, lawyers often
assume that idiosyncratic decisions are the result of incompetence. Another interpretation might seem less obvious when interacting with the elderly: idiosyncrasy might be
idiosyncrasy. After all, many non-elderly lead lives in ways that stray from the norm, and
these non-elderly might well be seen not as incompetent, but as original or bold.").
78.
See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn, ElderEmpowerment as a Strategy for Curbingthe Hidden Abuses of
DurablePowers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 27 (2006).
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psychological tests have indicated that an individual's perceived
sense of independent control is positively correlated with one's
mental and physical health. Unfortunately, in cases where capacity
is ambiguous, lawyers are prone to go beyond traditional fiduciary
duties and make decisions that are inconsistent with their clients'
preferences."' Framing the problem solely as a capacity conflict can
thus disguise overarching issues that are left unresolved by current
methods of capacity evaluation.
Society's interest in allowing individuals to make their own decisions is generally afforded great weight. 2 In assessing the law's
stance on substantive fairness in capacity diagnoses, it is important
to remember the underlying ageism of modern society." Common
mental and physical disorders associated with old age can lead the
public to have misgivings over the competency of senior citizens.
Senior citizens are thus routinely faced with significant questioning
regarding decisions that would likely not be challenged if made by
young or middle-aged individuals:
Like many younger individuals, an elderly man or woman may
choose to .. . spend money in ways others deem frivolous. For
example, he or she may choose to buy companionship by lavishing funds on a companion whose friendship is motivated at
least partly by avarice .... However frivolous the expenditures
or distasteful the motives of the companion, the individual
may derive a great deal of pleasure from the arrangement.

79.
See, e.g., Ellen J. Langer & Judith Rodin, The Effects of Choice and Enhanced Personal
Responsibilityfor the Aged: A Field Experiment in an Institutional Setting, 34 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSycuOL. 191 (1976).
See, e.g., Kohn, supranote 78, at 32 ("The lack of clarity as to decision-making rules
80.
undoubtedly contributes to agents' willingness to make decisions that are inconsistent with
principals' wishes and values.").
See Rein, supra note 7, at 243 (recognizing the importance of preserving an elderly
81.
client's feeling of independence and criticizing capacity methods for ignoring this concept).
82.
See, e.g., Rein, supra note 1, at 1164.
See generally Linda S. Whitton, Ageism: Paternalismand Prejudice,46 DEPAUL L. REv. 453
83.
(1997) (examining how prejudice against the elderly affects results in the courts and legislatures). For a definition of ageism, see The Image ofAging in Media and Marketing: Hearingbefore the
S. Special Comm. on Aging, 107th Cong. 12 (2002) (statement of Robert N. Butler, President and
Chief Exec. Officer, Int'l Longevity Ctr.), availableat http:// frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=107senate-hearings&docid=f:83476.wais (defining ageism as "a systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against people simply because they are old").
84.
See Whitton, supra note 83.
85. Jan Ellen Rein, PreservingDignity and Self-Determination of the Elderly in the Face of
Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives: A Proposalfor Statutory Refocus and Reform, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1818, 1874 (1992).
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Ageism may specifically influence Model Rule 1.14's fourth factor of an attorney's capacity evaluation, which measures whether a
client's decisions are made in correspondence with the client's lifelong values. This guideline is generally effective, but it does not
take into consideration the possibility that a client's life values may
change over time. In such a case, an attorney may view a change in
a client's values as a sign of incompetency even if these changes are
reasonable to the client. For example, an elderly client's choice to
give a large donation to her faith group may trigger capacity inquiries. However, such charitable donations may be caused by
many other factors, like loneliness. As an indirect result of society's ageism, current legal capacity guidelines for diagnosis may lack
objectivity and accuracy.
II. CURRENT INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES:
ASSISTING LEGAL CAPACITY EVALUATIONS REMAINS
IMPRACTICAL UNDER CURRENT LAW

The ethical obligation to screen a client's legal capacity leads the
lawyer down a path of ambiguous diagnosis standards, offering limited practical guidance. Although the revised Model Rules aim to
recognize the challenge of capacity determinations by suggesting a
contextual approach, a critical question remains: How does the
lawyer reach a reasonable and confident belief that the client has
diminished capacity?
Diagnostician consultation is arguably the most effective and accurate way of assessing capacity. However, attorneys routinely

struggle with this method because in many states, local laws have
discouraged the establishment of legal models that allow professional interdisciplinary teams. In light of this, Part II will first
86.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 6 (2009) ("In determining the

extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider ... the consistency of a
decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client.").
87.
Many other reasons may account for a senior citizen to make decisions that seem
unwise. As he ages, it may become more personally important to make peace with people,
find or maintain spiritual health, or have a sense he personally contributed to something of
interest. See Rein, supra note 7, at 243.
88,
See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Nassau Hospital, 429 N.YS.2d 262, 264 (N.Y App. Div.
1980) (holding that an attorney's requested medical examination of a client, whose case did
not result in litigation until twelve years later, was not privileged); In re Estate of Wood, 818
A.2d 568, 571-72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding that comments made and reports given by a
patient's physician to his attorney were not protected by attorney-client privilege). In addition to case-law, many state model rules of professional conduct hinder work models that
incorporate third-party client services. See, e.g., KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4
(2007); Boumil et al., supra note 43, at 119-20.
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briefly look at how diagnostic consultations naturally complement
legal capacity decisions. This Section will then highlight the challenges of a current law firm model that routinely incorporates such
services: the general multidisciplinary firm.

A. DiagnosticianConsultations

Consultation with a professional diagnostician is said to be one
of a lawyer's most helpful tools in assessing legal capacity because it
provides an independent and objective assessment. 9 This method
limits the inevitable subjectivity of an attorney's capacity evaluation
by including more objective testing that is subject to more consistent documentation." It is important to note that such
consultations are meant to be strictly advisory, and are without legal force, because legal capacity is a largely context-specific
determination that is judged with respect to the specific decision
confronting the client2 ' A medical or social worker consultation is
not meant to provide conclusive evidence for an attorney's capacity
evaluation, because capacity for informed legal decision-making is
not necessarily the same thing as capacity to engage in the attorneyclient relationship. 2 Thus, it is the professional role of the attorney
to translate the scientific advisory opinions into legal judgments.
Unfortunately, a lack of medical or scientific training leaves attorneys ill-equipped to make formal capacity evaluations using the
current objective evaluation tests." By working regularly with other
professionals, lawyers can better understand an elderly client's
mental and lifestyle needs. In an interview with the Director of the
Colorado Coalition of Legal Services Programs, Dr. Leonard Hellman said: "[S] ocial workers and psychologists have a better handle
89.
See, e.g., A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS, supra note 4, at vi, 31.
90.
Professor Rein argues that the Model Rules' lack of guidance for objective assessment of legal capacity may lead lawyers to apply their own life experiences, values, and
stereotypes. See Rein, supra note 1, at 1127; ERSHOW-LEVENBERG, supra note 55, at 4 of R.P.C.
1.14: REPRESENTING THE CLIENT WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY (However, as one commentator cautions, "in representing elderly clients situations arise with increasing frequency that
challenge the attorney's ability to react on a 'gut' instinct alone.") (citing Edwin Boyer, Representing the Client with Marginal Capacity: Challenges for the Elder Law Attorney-A Resource Guide,
12 NAELA Q. 3, 7 (Spring 1999)).
91.
See A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS, supra note 4, at vii, 5 ("The ultimate question of
capacity is a legal-and in some cases ajudicial-determination, not a clinical finding.").
92.
See ERSHOw-LEVENBERG, supranote 55, at 5.
93.
Cf. A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS, supra note 4, at v ("Some might argue that without

training in mental disorders of aging methods of formal capacity evaluation, lawyers should
not be making determinations about capacity. Yet lawyers necessarily are faced with an assessment or at least a screening of capacity in a rising number of cases ... .").
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I can't imagine an attor-

ney, no matter what his background is, in a legal office trying to
determine competence."4 Psychological tests can provide objective
cognitive and behavioral data that attorneys do not have the skills
to interpret.95
Mainstream capacity tests often yield incomplete data and serve
as warning signals rather than diagnostic tools. For example, the
Baird Brown legal capacity questionnaire (LCQ) 5 is a commonly
used questionnaire that tests for cognitive impairment, but has
been criticized for its lack of reliable data. In situations where the
client has indicated she is functioning at a borderline or low capacity, attorneys ought to investigate capacity further and should seek
expert consultation.98 Additionally, the Folstein examination, often
referred to as the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE), evaluates certain mental abilities99 but has questionable accuracy in
assessing legal capacity.00 To properly interpret the results' implications, attorneys should use the LCQ or the MMSE in conjunction

Health Care Optionsfor the Elderly: NCPL Seminar Probes Attorney Dilemma in Determin94.
ing Competency of Client, PREVENTIVE L. REP., Dec. 1988, at 22, 24 (edited transcript)
(statement of Dr. Leonard Hellman of the Mercy Senior Health Clinic of Denver, Colorado,
who is also an attorney).
SeeA HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS, supra note 4, at 31.
95.
The test is divided into true/false, multiple choice, and short answer questions.
96.
Client capacity is scored into three categories: high (attorney can proceed "with confidence"), borderline (attorney can proceed "with caution"), and low (attorneys should
exercise "extreme caution"). See Daniel C. Marson et al., Testamentary Capacity and Undue
Influence in the Elderly: A jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 71, 89-90
(2004).
Id. at 90 ("Limitations from a psychological science standpoint include the lack of
97.
an underlying conceptual psychological model, the absence of reliability and validity data,
and the failure of the LCQ to address the element of understanding a will . . . .").
ARTHUR C. WALSH ET AL., MENTAL CAPACITY: LEGAL AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF
98.
ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT, 159-68 (1994) (summarizing typical age-related brain changes and highlighting the value of medical tests to confirm such changes are ordinary vs.
serious).
99.
The MMSE is a thirty-point questionnaire that tests for word recall, attention/calculation, language abilities, and visuospatial abilities. Additionally, a client will be
asked questions regarding time orientation, such as the current year, season, or date. See,
e.g., Marshal F. Folstein et al., "Mini-MentalState": A PracticalMethod for Gradingthe Cognitive
State of Patientsfor the Clinician, 12J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 189 (1975).
100. The test is not designed to measure executive functions, which concern the capacity to consider options and their consequences, as well as planning, monitoring, and
stopping inappropriate behavior. Furthermore, current research has begun to question its
accuracy in assessing legal capacity. See Arun Aggarwall & Emma Kean, Comparison of the
Folstein Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) to the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) as a
Cognitive Screening Tool in an Inpatient Rehabilitation Setting, 1 NEUROSCIENCE & MED. 39
(2010).
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with other assessment tools because they serve only to indicate a
need for further assessment by an independent source.'0s
In sum, while these types of standardized screenings are popular
among attorneys for their ease of use and clear structure, they can
often be difficult to adapt to a client's specific cognitive task,102 and
interpreting their results may require specialized training. Thus,
such assessment tools should be complemented by working alongside third-party professionals.

B. The MultidisciplinaryPracticeModel

The legal field has failed to establish a working model that effectively utilizes diagnostician consultations. Ethical and procedural
standards hinder firms from routinely working with non-legal
teams and exposing confidential legal information in capacity
evaluations. This Section presents the example of a model currently endorsed in Washington, D.C., 03 which remains the only
jurisdiction that provides a pragmatic structure for law firms to follow regarding interdisciplinary client services.
During the past decade, the legal community has seen an increase in support for a more expansive legal services model, known
104
as multidisciplinary practice. This form of practice can more
effectively respond to the needs of an elder client, whether they
stem from legal, medical, social, or financial circumstances. The
benefits of multidisciplinary practice are particularly salient to
the capacity diagnosis problem because they offer a means to
regularly request professional third-party examinations.

101. See Donald D. Vanarelli, Client Capacity-Assessment and Advocacy, N.J. LAW., Aug.
2010, at 9. For an additional example, see HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS, supra note 4, at 13-30
(structuring the lawyer's diagnostic role as a series of systematic screenings at separate stages
and emphasizing that its results should not be considered sufficient proof of diminished
capacity). According to this guidebook, the first stage is a preliminary screening of client
capacity. If necessary, the second stage involves a referral for professional consultation. Finally, the third stage involves a legal judgment of whether a client's capacity is sufficient to
warrant continuing the attorney-client relationship as requested. See id. at 31-41.
102. These cognitive legal tasks may include marrying, divorcing, property division, etc.
See Sabatino, supra note 33.
103. Cf Matthew W. Bish, Revising Model Rule 5.4: Adopting a Regulatory Scheme That Permits Nonlawyer Ownership and Management of Law Firms, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 669, 679-80 (2009)
(stating that D.C.'s equivalent to Model Rule 5.4 is the only state-adopted rule that has allowed for lawyer-nonlawyer partnerships).
104. See, e.g., Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision Through Multidisciplinary PracticeEncouragingHolistic Advocacy while ProtectingEthical Interests, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 787, 790-91
(2002) (examining the current debate on multidisciplinary practice in the context of legal
services in a non-profit setting).
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Despite its benefits, the multidisciplinary model remains controversial because of the long-standing debate over combining legal
assistance with other professional services. 15 Since the 1980s, major
efforts have been made to urge the ABA to amend its ethical rules
to allow for a multidisciplinary legal model. o0 In 1998, the ABA
created the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, which held
public hearings in order to develop its recommendations regarding the regulation of such enterprises. On June 8, 1999, the
Commission recommended that the ABA revise the Model Rules to
allow lawyers and non-lawyers to engage in limited forms of multidisciplinary practice.1 0 7 But on July 11, 2000, the ABA voted to
maintain the Model Rules' ban on fee sharing between lawyers
and non-lawyers, and on non-lawyer managerial control over law
firms. 08 Moreover, the ABA urged states to resist the adoption of
multidisciplinary firms in order to "preserve the core values of
the legal profession., 09
C. Current Confidentiality and EthicalRegulations Hinder
Mass Adoption of Both MultidisciplinaryFirms and
the General Use of Third-Party Consultations
Working simultaneously with legal and non-legal professionals
can potentially lead to confusion regarding professional ethical
105. See, e.g., Janine Robben, ProtectingMom and Dad: Lawyers Take Different Approaches to
Elder Law, 71 OR. ST. B. BULL. 18 (2011) (highlighting the current debate on adopting multidisciplinary practices in Oregon and its impact on elder law).

106. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing
Legal Services From Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217,
241-42 (2000) (summarizing the Kutak Commission's criticism of the ABA's ban on multidisciplinary practice).
107. Am. BAR Ass'N, COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION (2000), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional-responsibility/commission multidisciplinary-practice/mdprecommendation.html.
108. Am. BAR Ass'N, REVISED RECOMMENDATION 10F (2000), available at http://
(last visited Oct. 28,
www.americanbar.org/groups/leadership/2000dailyjournall0.html

2011).
109.

The core values referenced include:

(a) the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty; (b) the lawyer's duty competently to exercise independent legal judgment for the benefit of the client; (c) the lawyer's duty to
hold client confidences inviolate; (d) the lawyer's duty to avoid conflicts of interest
with the client; (e) the lawyer's duty to help maintain a single profession of law with
responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice; and (f) the lawyer's
duty to promote access to justice.

Id.
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obligations.o This variance of ethical duties across professions can
threaten client privacy.
1. A Lawyer's Duties and Restrictions
In general, a lawyer may not reveal information relating to a client's representation to any other party unless the client gives the
lawyer explicit or implicit permission to do so."' Once permission
is provided and disclosure is made to an outside party, protection
from civil discovery may no longer be absolute." 3
The application of the attorney-client privilege to professional
third-party consultations is context-specific."'4 For example, in a
case where a doctor was consulted to assist a lawyer for upcoming
litigation, the court extended the attorney-client privilege to the
client's statements to the doctor and the resulting diagnosis.1 '
However, a court may not extend protection to medical consultations if the client sought a medical consultation before obtaining
legal services.' 6 This case-by-case analysis poses risks to an elderly
client because it raises uncertainty as to whether such information
may be exposed in future proceedings. As a result, lawyers and clients are likely to exercise extreme caution when working with
outside parties to determine legal capacity."'

110. Tamara L. Vergara, Multidisciplinary Practice: The Debate Goes On, MOMKUS &
MCCLUSKY LLC, http://www.momlaw.com/articles/employment-law/multidisciplinary-practic
(last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
I11. See supra Part I.A.2.
112. While this is the general rule, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009) lists
several exceptions when a lawyer is authorized to disclose client information without consent. Further restrictions may also apply under FED. R. EVID. 502.
113. See A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS, supra note 4, at 31.
114. See Michele D. Beardslee, The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege: Third-Rate Doctrinefor
Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REv. 727 (2009) for a general discussion of the law's inconsistent application of attorney-client privilege regarding third-party consultations.
115. SeeJones v. Superior Court, 372 P.2d 919, 921-22 (Cal. 1962) (holding that the attorney-client privilege was extended where the client was sent to the physician by an attorney
to assist in his defense).
116. In re Estate of Wood, 818 A.2d 568, 571-72 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2003) (attorney-client
privilege was not extended to comments made by a patient's doctor to his attorney). This
particular scenario often arises in the multidisciplinary legal model. See Boumil et al., supra
note 43, for a further discussion as to how this inconsistency specifically occurs in medicallegal partnerships.
117. Some may argue that this dilemma could be solved with a boilerplate contract that
holds an outside party to the same ethical obligations as the lawyer. However, this depends
on the lawyer and offers no guarantee of it being universally followed. See infra Part III for a
further discussion of implementing a uniform reform.

SPRING

2012]

Reform That UnderstandsOur Seniors

715

2. A Doctor's Duties and Restrictions
Medical duties and regulations affect a multidisciplinary firm
when attorneys seek access to a client's medical information and
when such information needs to be protected from pretrial discovery. In 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was enacted, enforcing a doctor's duty to protect patient confidentiality."'8 HIPAA governs the use and disclosure
of protected health information, which includes names, dates pertaining to an individual's health care, phone and fax numbers,
social security numbers, medical record numbers, account numbers, and license numbers."9 Because HIPAA plays a significant
role in regulating the disclosure of a client's medical information
when lawyers seek the consultation of medical professionals, it is
pertinent to this Note's analysis of obstacles facing elder law practitioners.
When evaluating a client's legal capacity, a doctor generally must
obtain the client's written authorization to disclose her health information to her lawyer. 20 However, HIPAA permits disclosure of
protected health information to a covered entity, such as a patient's lawyer, without a patient's consent if the information is to be
used for treatment, payment, or health care operations.'' The law
remains unclear as to if and when a multidisciplinary practice team
may fall into the treatment exemption.' Regardless, full disclosure
should be made to elderly clients of any potential differences in
professional obligations between the lawyer and doctor before obtaining consent to third-party consultations.

118.

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 201, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1320a-7c (A) (3) (B) (ii) (2006).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (4) (2006); 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2009).
120. See, e.g., Celia B. Fisher & Matthew Oransky, Informed Consent to Psychotherapy: Protecting the Dignity and Respecting the Autonomy of Patients, 64 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 576, 584-85
(2008).
121. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2002). Disclosure is defined as "the release, transfer, provision
of, access to, or divulging in any other manner of information outside the entity holding the
information." Id. § 160.103. Use is defined as "the sharing, employment, application, utilization, examination, or analysis of such information within an entity that maintains such
information." See id. HIPPA governs the disclosure to covered entities and business associates
(e.g. lawyers). Id.
122. See Boumil et al., supra note 43, at 133 (citingJERRY TICHNER, INTRODUCTORY FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING HIPAA, PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE
available at http://www.medical(2008),
MODEL
PARTNERSHIP
MEDICAL-LEGAL
legalpartnership.org/sites/default/files/page/FAQ(2).pdf). But see Powell & Link, supra
note 39, at 1234-35 ("[W]ithout E's authorization, L is no more entitled to information
from E's physician about their consultations than the physician would be entitled to consultative information from L's meetings with E.").
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Aside from limiting a lawyer's access to patient records, a doctor's ethical duties might not protect confidentiality when it is
unclear if a true patient-doctor relationship is formed. 2 3 Although
a doctor's notes might still be protected from adverse third parties
under the lawyer's work product doctrine,' such notes will only be
protected if they are made in the course or anticipation of litigation. However, the extent of protection in this scenario will vary
by state and circumstance, and it affords limited relevance in the
largely transactional practice of elder law.1'2
3. A Social Worker's Duties and Restrictions
Elderly clients may be reluctant to seek legal advice when they
are required to be interviewed by social workers who are obligated
to report certain findings to the state.'2 ' For example, even if a client tells his attorney that a family member is abusive, the client
may wish to seek counseling instead of criminal sanctions. While a
lawyer may not disclose an elderly client's explicit communication
of abuse without the client's permission, social workers' mandatory disclosure duties could interfere with a client's wishes. Clients
and their lawyers would then need to take care to avoid full disclo123. See Powell & Link, supra note 39 at 1236-37 (analyzing the ambiguity of doctorpatient relations when lawyers request medical exams).
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3). The work product doctrine protects an attorney's written material, mental impressions, opinions, and theories made in anticipation of and during
the course of litigation. The Supreme Court originally recognized this doctrine in Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947) ("This work is reflected, of course, in interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and
countless other tangible and intangible ways-aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals in this case (153 F.2d 212, 223) as the 'Work product of the lawyer.' Were
such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is not put down in
writing would remain unwritten.").
125. This assumes that the client has consented to the examination. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b) (3).
126. Subsequent litigation may stem from transactional counseling with elderly clients,
and it remains unclear how the work product doctrine will protect a client's past interdisciplinary consultations in this context. See generally Boumil et al., supra note 43, at 120-23 for
further details and examples of this inconsistency.
127. Similar stipulations may also exist for doctors and other mental health providers.
See Wydra, supra note 10, at 1527-30 ("Confidentiality is jeopardized when some professionals in the team are obligated by statue to report suspected incidents of abuse that the lawyer
is not obligated to report."). For example, in some states social workers have a duty to report
explicit or implied communications of elder abuse. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-451
(2010). See also Gerald L. Jogerst et al., Domestic Elder Abuse and the Law, 93 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 2131 (2003) (presenting a statistical analysis of the differing elder abuse state laws

and their effect on national elder abuse).
128. See Sarah S. Sandusky, Note, The Luawyer's Role in Combating the Hidden Crime of Elder
Abuse, 11 ELDER L.J. 459, 472-73 (2003).
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sure in collaborative work sessions. The increased threat to confidentiality and the varying levels of disclosure between the client
and her professional team members limit the efficacy of multidisciplinary service models.
Social workers are "ethically bound to evaluate the totality of circumstances and protect what they believe to be the client's best
interest."129 In contrast, lawyers are trained to fully represent a client's legal interests as generally defined by the client. Elderly clients
seeking legal assistance should be made aware of these differing
obligations before consent is given to any third-party consultations
for capacity tests. It has been suggested that having this conversation near the beginning of a legal relationship where capacity is
questionable can inhibit a client's personal connection to the attorney or other professionals.130 A resulting lack of trust may lead
clients to divulge only minimal amounts of information, but this
risk should be weighed against the chance that a client reveal damaging confidential information to a mandatory reporter.13

III.

Two-PART REFORM: REVISING LEGAL RULES AND INTRODUCING
NEW MODEL STRUCTURES TO MAKE MULTIDISCIPLINARY
SERVICES A PRACTICAL OPTION FOR ATTORNEYS

This Section suggests multiple reforms to assist attorneys in seeking independent professional assistance for determining a client's
legal capacity. This can be accomplished by amending the Model
Rules as well as states' procedural rules in order to preserve confidentiality in interdisciplinary communications. Furthermore,
this Section proposes that states consider the legalization of two
alternative service models: lawyer/non-lawyer partnerships and
state-sponsored consultation panels. These reforms both expand
pragmatic legal counseling solutions for attorneys and preserve
the privacy of clients.

129. Brustin, supra note 104, at 862 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 842 ("Some suggest that having this conversation at such an early stage can
inhibit the building of rapport between the client and the lawyer and the client and the
social worker. Clients may not be able to understand the distinction between lawyers' obligations and social workers' obligations and the client may decide that the safest course of
action is not to divulge much information.").
131. See id.
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A. Legal Revisions: Ethical and ProceduralRule Changes

Reform options for assessing legal capacity should not only provide ease of access between attorneys and third-party
diagnosticians, but they should also be mindful of elderly clients'
autonomy needs. For an interdisciplinary approach to be effective,
communication among the team must remain privileged, enabling
3
team members to exchange information freely.'1
States should adopt a disclosure exception to their respective
Model Rules that would authorize inter-professional communications made for the purpose of evaluating a client's mental capacity.'
Attorneys are currently deterred from utilizing independent professional services in part because of client confidentiality restraints.' 4
In order to encourage states to amend their respective rules, the
American Bar Association should approve the addition of such a
disclosure exception to the Model Rules. Because states often look
to the Model Rules for guidance when amending their respective
rules, amendments to Model Rules 1.6 and 1.14 will make a significant impact and will likely persuade states to follow suit.
A potential criticism of this reform is that it fails to address the
concern that clients will be unlikely to consent to third-party evaluations. 3 6 Without the explicit consent of their clients, lawyers are
limited to hypothetical case analyses that are of minimal use.'3 7 In
order to address this, new state ethical and procedural rules should
be enacted to limit the specific use of exam results in future litiga-

132. Wydra, supra note 10, at 1542.
133. States should also consider adopting their procedural and evidentiary rules to protect client confidentiality and incentivize clients to consent to third-party collaboration. See
infra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
134. Rule 1.6(a) forbids a lawyer from revealing client information without informed
consent. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009). Model Rule 1.14 only permits
an exceptions to this rule after an attorney has formed a reasonable belief that the client has
diminished capacity. Id. R. 1.14. Thus, a lawyer is not afforded a disclosure exceptions during the assessment of a client's capacity. Cf A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS, supra note 4, at v
("[Rule 1.14] triggers protective action when an attorney reasonably believes that a client
has diminished capacity, that there is a potential for harm to the client, and that the client
cannot act in his or her own interest. However, the critical question is: how does the lawyer
reach a reasonable belief that the client has diminished capacity?").
135. The Model Rules are made in part to offer guidance to states. See, e.g., Am. BAR
AsS'N, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MJP POLICIES (2010), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/recommedations.authcheckd
am.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) (listing states' implementations of the ABA's
multijurisdictional practice of law policies).
136. Clients may be unlikely to consent out of fear that the results may restrict their
legal freedoms. See infra Part I.A.
137. See supra note 45.
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tion or involuntary legal proceedings.' For example, if the client
has voluntarily consented to consultation, an exception should be
added that insulates the disclosure of third-party consultation results in future proceedings.
Some may argue that a more pragmatic solution would be to use
a boilerplate contract that would hold third-party professionals to
the same confidentiality rules as the attorney. But this alone would
not provide an adequate enforcement effect because it would rely
9
entirely on the legal practitioner to implement such solutions. 3 In
contrast, complementing such contracts with amendments to the
Model Rules would raise further awareness and offer a uniform
solution to a broader audience. 140
B. ProposedModel Structures That Better Foster
the Utilization of InterdisciplinaryServices
In addition to revising ethical rules and legal disclosure
exceptions, states should allow for realistic business models where
lawyers may utilize interdisciplinary teams. Currently, the Model
Rules offer minimal guidance for lawyers who seek outside
professional consultations. The explicit incorporation of both
lawyer/non-lawyer partnerships and state-sponsored advisory panels
into the Model Rules would provide elderly clients with streamlined
access to a variety of professional services.
1. Lawyer/Non-lawyer Partnerships
The Model Rules, as well as state ethical rules, should be
amended to foster the formation of lawyer/non-lawyer partnerships. This structure is particularly beneficial to clients because it
adds convenience and simplicity through a multidimensional problem solving approach.14 1 For instance, working for a single entity
138. Professor Rein has proposed that states prohibit "the use of any information about
the client's condition gained by anyone as a result of lawyer-diagnostician cooperation from
being used as a basis for, or evidence of, incompetency in any subsequent proceeding." Rein,
supra note 1, at 1152-53.
139. This would also do little to protect against discovery. See infra Part III.B.1 for a further discussion involving reform of the interdisciplinary firm model.
140. Cf Rein, supra note 1, at 1150 ("Cooperation between medical and legal professionals in making competency assessments will ultimately depend on the extent to which the

drafters of the ethics rules for each profession can themselves cooperate in developing an
inter-disciplinary approach to the problem.").
141. See supra Part II.B.
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would improve teamwork, efficiency, and strategic planning among
attorneys and non-attorneys alike.14 2
In this working relationship, third-party professionals would be
offered an opportunity to serve as partners. 4 3 This structure can
be a more attractive option than an employee relationship because a partnership model offers a greater sense of prestige and
decisionmaking power.'" Furthermore, because partner status
traditionally includes ownership interest in the company, nonlawyers would become more motivated and dedicated to maximizing
company efficiency.'4"
States should amend their Rules of Professional Conduct to
allow for interdisciplinary partnerships by following the language
of D.C. Rule 5.4. While state legal policies have generally been
consistent with the ABA's ban on non-lawyer partnerships,'4 6 the
District of Columbia is currently the only jurisdiction that has
expressly authorized a more flexible approach. 4 D.C. Rule 5.4(b)
explicitly allows lawyers to "practice law in a partnership or other
form of organization in which a financial interest is held or
managerial authority is exercised by an individual non-lawyer who
performs professional services which assist the organization in
providing legal services to clients."' Comments 2 and 4 to D.C.'s
Rule 5.4(b) note that lawyers are permitted to work with nonlawyers to meet the growing complexity of client demands. 4 9

142. See Carolyn L. Abramowitz, MultidisciplinaryPractice: Will We Vote Ourselves out of the
Competition, 54 WASH. ST. B. NEWs 20, 24 (2000).
143. While it is up to the firm's ultimate discretion to decide how many third-party professionals to hire, in some circumstances a firm might need to hire more than the
partnership structure could allow. In this exceptional scenario, firms would likely initially
hire these professionals as employees or associates with the prospect of eventually earning
partner status.
144. This assumes that the third-party professional would serve as a partner rather than
an employee for the entity. A partner is given equity in the firm, access to financial data, and
an opportunity to be regarded with senior status. See Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The
Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383, 394
(1988).
145. Matthew W. Bish, Note, Revising Model Rule 5.4: Adopting a Regulatory Scheme That
Pennits Nonlawyer Ownership and Management of Law Firms, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 669, 684-86
(2009) (noting that distribution of stock options inspires employee recipients to believe they
have an ownership stake in the company, which will then encourage them to monitor other
coworkers and superiors).
146. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 with, e.g., MicH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2009). See also Bish, supra note 145, at 670.
147. See Brustin, supra note 104, at 807-10 (explaining that D.C. is the only jurisdiction
that expressly permits lawyer/non-lawyer partnerships).
148. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2007). See subsections 1-4 under 5.4(b) for
further requirements.
149. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 cmt. 2, 4 (2007).
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The greatest criticism of permitting lawyer/non-lawyer partnerships is that a mix of professionals could have clashing interests
and duties. State bar associations fear that lawyers' ethical duties
could be compromised in a company with non-lawyer partners be-

cause of the assumption that the partnership's focus would shift
towards profit-maximizing initiatives.1 so For example, the New York
State Bar Association's total rejection of the multidisciplinary practice model reflected the concern that lawyers' professional
judgment and legal independence would become compromised if
non-lawyers exercised control at higher echelons of the law firm or
business structure.'5 The report expressed concern that non-legal
professionals were exempt from stringent professional rules of conduct governing lawyers and would be guided by economic motives. 5 1
Moreover, some commentators warn that if multidisciplinary firms
were legalized, they would emulate the size of many of today's
mega firms because of the potential breadth of the interdisciplinary workforces.' The effect could be a monopoly of the elder law
client base, excluding many smaller firms and solo practitioners.15 4
Such criticism of interdisciplinary partnerships is based on unproven and arguably flawed assumptions. When considering this
argument, it is critical to address the underlying question: Can ethical, competent representation coexist with a profit-driven focus?
The D.C. Bar's Special Committee on Multidisciplinary Practice
found no evidence that D.C. Rule 5.4 resulted in public harm
when lawyers shared fees with non-attorneys who strictly advised in
legal counseling matters. 5 A large portion of today's lawyers
would likely discontinue the practice of law if they did not receive

150. Cf supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text (stating the ABA's reasoning for
not allowing Model Rule exceptions for multidisciplinary firms).
151. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N SPECIAL COMM. ON THE LAW GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE
AND OPERATION, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION: THE
PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). However,
New York has since lessoned its opposition to multidisciplinary practices. The New York

State Bar Association went on to adopt provisions that supported "side by side" collaboration
arrangements between lawyers and non-lawyers. While the state still rejects fully integrated
multidisciplinary practices, these subsequent revisions now provide more flexibility regarding the matter. See N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. CODE OF PROF. RESP. 1200.5-b(a)-(b)
(2002).
152. Id. See also Brustin, supranote 104, at 818-19 for an analysis of this report, as well as
a comparison to D.C.'s Rule 5.4.
153.

E.g., Brustin, supra note 104, at 812.

154.

See infra Part III. B.2. for a publicly-funded solution that eliminates this concern.
See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF D.C. BAR SPECIAL COMM. ON MULTIDISCIPRACTICE 7 (Oct. 23, 2001).

155.
PLINARY
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a profit. " In order to maximize profits, firms seek repeat clients.
Thus, firms motivated by profits have an incentive to refrain from
self-dealing."' Finally, clients deserve a lawyer who has access to the
most accurate information available by trained professionals, and
this justifies legalizing a consolidated interdisciplinary model.
2. State-Sponsored Advisory Consultation Panels
In conjunction with, or as an alternative to, legalizing lawyer/non-lawyer partnerships, this Note proposes that states
establish public interdisciplinary panels to assist elder law attorneys
and capacity diagnosticians. Lawyers would be able to call upon
these panels for consultations regarding legal capacity inquiries.
The panel would consist of professionals trained to evaluate an elderly client's mental capacity, and would include physicians,
mental health specialists/therapists, gerontologists, social workers,
and lawyers.
It is critical that this panel remain dedicated to serving as an advisory board, and that states not render its recommendations
mandatory. In other words, the panel should be an interdisciplinary consulting service where lawyers or clients may voluntarily
seek an independent and objective analysis in legally ambiguous
contexts, such as client capacity assessment. It would be ill-advised
to make such consultations mandatory because of the undue infringement on a client's rights.
Like other interdisciplinary models, this advisory panel would
offer a one-stop shop of resources for attorneys of elderly clients."'
If adopted alongside the reform suggested in Part III.A., confidentiality rules would not be a concern because all members of the
156. See Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and UnethicalProfession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871, 895-903 (1999) (depicting lawyers
to be largely trapped in a competitive quest for higher income).
157. See Bish, supra note 145, at 694 ("[I1f, in order to achieve a higher profit on a client's current project, a firm delivered sub-par services. . . then that client would not become
a repeat customer, and the firm would forfeit the potential premium a client would pay for
quality service.").
158. Lawyers would have to be conscious of potential conflicts of interests with current clients. Thus, it would be more pragmatic to offer the position to a lawyer whose
practice and client base are no longer active. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.11 (2009) for ethical restrictions regarding legal conflicts of interests.
159. Depending on the state's plan, these resources could expand beyond legal counseling including recommendations to counseling, prescription monitoring, social assistance,
nutritional consultation, and physical therapy. See Corinne N. Lalli, Note, Multidisciplinary
Practices: The Ultimate Department Store for Professionals, 17 ST. JOHN'S J.L. CoMm. 283 (2003)
for a description of potential resources offered under the private one-stop shop model.

SPRING

2012]

Reform That Understands Our Seniors

723

diversified panel would be held to the same rules of nondisclosure. 60 This would preserve the personal trust and rapport that is
essential to a healthy attorney-client relationship.
While offering many of the same potential benefits as the lawyer/non-lawyer partnership model, this advisory panel could avoid
the fears of profit-driven management. Governmental control
would serve a critical role in this respect. Because this option
would be at least partially publicly funded, the panel's consultation
would remain objective and not motivated by extraneous financial
factors.'' Although some clients and attorneys may have the resources to afford this service, this panel should be a publicly
funded resource with sliding scale fees in order to both maintain
an objective focus and not financially exclude any part of the
community. Additionally, this solution would better preserve the
solo practice of elder law because these resources would be publicly accessible.
Unlike lawyer/non-lawyer partnerships, the biggest potential obstacle to this reform would be its financial cost. The projected start
up costs for this option would likely be minimal, covering mainly
experts' compensation. The structure would demand relatively no
overhead costs because the professionals would not necessarily
need to be physically located in one location. This solution would
allow for the panel to convene on a case-by-case basis, and could
individually evaluate clients on a flexible schedule. Additionally,
any lab equipment use could be contracted with local facilities.
However, if the caseload grows substantially, operating and fixed
costs may become more substantial. For example, each case would
include the hourly rates for board members as well as the necessary
cognitive or neurological tests. Additionally, an administrative system would need to be implemented to identify panel participants,
assign cases to willing participants, and establish procedural guidelines for the teams. Finally, if the growing caseload overwhelms

160. If the client has voluntarily consented to consulting this panel, then the reform described in Part III.A. would prevent disclosure of these results in future guardianship
proceedings. Essentially, these state run panels are a publicly funded version of the lawyer/non-lawyer partnerships.
161. Public control may not completely eliminate the possibility of a private profit motive. However, government-sponsored non-profit entities are arguably more likely to offer
services for a social purpose with less concern for a profit gain. Cf BERNICE A. PESCOSOLIDO
ET AL., HANDBOOK OF THE SoCIOLOGY OF HEALTH, ILLNESS, AND HEALING: A BLUEPRINT FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 262 (2011) ("Nonprofit organizations are legitimate providers because
they are not motivated by profit. Nonprofit organizations can be trusted to protect consumers.").
162. See text accompanying notes 153-154.
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local diagnostic centers, the panel would need to invest in its own
test equipment.
In response, states will need to consider creative ways to fundraise or reconfigure their finances in order to absorb these added
costs. Although there is a significant range in state budgets, a
slight increase in state court filing fees could serve as one example of an easily administered source of funding.1 6 3 While this
might chill litigation because of higher costs, states have the ultimate discretion to adjust fees where they see fit so that the burden
is not imposed on the greater community.
The cost of investing in this reform is justified from the perspectives of the elderly, their attorneys, the government, and taxpayers.
Implementation of this panel offers seniors access to public health
resources and attorneys access to professional third-party resources. This advisory panel might also reduce confusion when
determining legal capacity and relieve overloaded court dockets.16
In sum, despite the potential increase in government expenses,
this reform would help solve the riddle of evaluating legal capacity
while avoiding a clash with legal ethics.

CONCLUSION

In reality, no one reform will completely remove the challenges
presented by capacity determinations. While the burden of assessing client capacity ultimately rests on the lawyer's shoulders,
interdisciplinary resources offer invaluable assistance. The revised
Model Rules reflect the general consensus that diagnostician consultation is a highly recommended outlet for forming "a
reasonable belief' of a client's diminished decisionmaking capabilities."'5 Despite this, more reform is needed for this option to
become a pragmatic alternative that can actually be implemented
by elder law attorneys. State ethical and procedural rules, as well as
the Model Rules, should be revised to permit attorneys' disclosure
of client information for the purpose of examining capacity. Additionally, states should strongly consider legalizing multidisciplinary
163. It is ultimately up to the states to decide a financial structure regarding this option.
State legal policies may play a role in determining whether the attorney or client should pay
such a fee. For example, if the state's rules of professional conduct specifically authorized an
attorney to seek outside consultations regarding a client's questionable capacity, then the
attorney could arguably charge this fee to the client. See supra Part III.A.1-2.
164. Ambiguity regarding client legal capacity may lead to malpractice suits from disgruntled family members, guardianship proceedings, etc. See supra Part I.
165. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2009).
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firm structures or publicly funded advisory boards so that lawyers
will have more accessible guidance for such matters.

